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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~lAUDE BAKER, 
Plaintiff and Resp1ovndent, 
vs. 
L. JANSEN, doing business as UTAH 
HOUSE CLEANING CO·MP ANY, 
Defendant 01nd A ppell(Jf}'l)t. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
~STATEMENT O·F FACTS 
Case No. 
7239 
Plaintiff, in addition to the Statement of Facts set 
forth in appellant's brief, submits the following facts: 
The plaintiff and respondent in this action is a 
woman 71 years of age (Tr. p. 107). There is conflict 
in the evidence as to the condition of the hall way on the 
n1orning of the accident. The defendant claims that 
the hallway was blocked off so that no one could go 
through the passageway without climbing over the ob-
struction or moving them (Tr. 'P'P· 123, 132, 139). De-
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fendant introduced photographic exhibits 1 through 4 
as illustrative of the condition of the hall at the time of 
the accident. These photographs were taken approxi-
mately a week before the trial ( Tr. pp. 116-120). Plain-
tiff's testimony tells a different story as to the condition 
of the hall and according to her evidence and that of 
her son, w}1.o entered the building immediately after the 
accident, no such blockade existed and there was plenty 
of room to walk down the hall (Tr. pp. 96, 100, 191). 
The plaintiff does not remember observing a;ny burning 
light ~anging from an extension cord directly above the 
table ( Tr. p. 9'7). There is also conflict in the evidence 
regarding the position of the drop cloth or canvas used 
by the defendant, the defendant stating that the canvas 
had :been folded neatly and placed under the table out 
of the way (Tr. pp. 113, 114). Plaintiff's testimony in-
dicates the drop cloth extended into the passageway in 
the hall and was ruffled and uneven (Tr. pp. 95, 190). 
ARGU·MEN·T 
Plaintiff's argument will be divided under the fol-
lowing headings : 
1. The court was correct in overruling defendent 
L. Jansen's general demurrer to plaintiff's amended 
compJaint. 
2. The defendant L. Jansen, or his employees, were 
guilty of negligence. 
3. The doctrine of assumption of risk is not ap-
plicable in this case. 
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4. The plaintiff was not guilt of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law. 
5. The trial court correctly instructed the jury as 
to the theory and law of the case. 
6. The trial court did not err in giving instruction 
Number 4, nor did the court err in instructing the jury 
orally and then striking a part thereof from said written 
instruction. 
1. THE CO·URT WAS CORRECT IN OVERR.UL-
ING DEFENDANT L. JAN·SEN'S GENERAL 
DE~fURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S AlYfENDED 
CO~IPLAINT. 
Plaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that she 
was a tenant in the apartment house where Jan sen was 
performing certain work and services; that the defend-
ant in performing such services negligently laid or per-
mitted the cloth and covering on the floor to become 
ruffled and uneven so that people traversing said hall-
way might catch their feet in the same and fall; that he 
permitted his tools to be strewn in the hallway so that 
it would be a hazard to the people. walking down said 
hallway; that he failed to notify individuals using the 
hall that they should not walk along said passageway, 
and that he failed to place any barricade to warn people 
not to walk along said passageway. From these facts 
it is clear that plaintiff was entitled to use said halhvay, 
and that the defendant owed a duty to her and the other 
tenants of the apartment house to keep the hallway in 
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such a condition that it could be traversed in safety or 
to have blocked the same off so that it could not be used. 
Plaintiff further alleges in her amended complaint, 
that by reason of the negligent acts of defendant, and 
she being unaware that the hallway should not be used, 
she proceeded along the same, caught her foot in the 
cloth, stumbled and was injured. As the court has stated 
in the case of Soule v. W e~atherby, et al., 39 Utah 580, 
118 P ac. 833 : 
''* * * * It is fundamental that, in order to 
state a good cause of action in any kind of a case, 
it must be made to appear from the face of the 
complaint, either by direct allegation or by neces-
sary or unavoidable inference from the facts 
stated, that there is a primary legal right in the 
plaintiff, a primary legal duty connected with 
such right resting on the defendant, and a breach 
of such duty. When these allegations are supple-
mented by a statement of the amount claimed and 
a prayer for judgment, which are formal matters 
merely, a complete cause as well as right of action 
is stated upon which the plaintiff is entitled to 
relief in accordance with the rules of practice 
and the substantive law relating to the subject-
matter.'' 
The plain tiff in this case· has elear ly come within these 
rules. 
Defendant states in his brief at page 10 thereof: 
"If the complaint could be construed to al-
lege a hazardous condition, plaintiff cannot he 
heard to say that she was unaware of such con-
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dition 'Yhen it Y\~as open and obvious, and she does 
not allege facts sho"yinp: a reason for her inability 
to observe.it. It is further apparent that plaintiff 
did not have to subject herself to the alleged 
hazard, for, as she states, there was a stairway 
leading to the first floor at each end of the hall-
way and plaintiff does not allege that. the hall-
way was hazardous in all of the directions avail-
able to her.'' 
By the above statement defendant has tried to place 
a strained interpretation upon plaintiff's amended com-
plaint, but even under defendant's construction the com-
plaint states a cause of action and does not show con-
tributory negligence as a Inatter of law. In the case 
of M~oore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 Pac. (2d) 676, this 
Court held that the question of contributory negligence 
was properly submitted to the jury. In the Miles case 
plaintiff testified that the west end of the hall was so 
dark that she could not see the stairs and that as she 
was walking slowly and feeling ahead with her feet 
she lost her balance at the first step and fell down the 
short flight of steps to the doorway. In the Miles case 
there was also another stairway which could have been 
used. The Court in this regard stated: 
''But defendant argues that since plaintiff 
had a choice of going do\vn the stairway into the 
lobby, which admittedly was well lighted, or do\vn 
the west stairway, to the parking lot which plain-
tiff testified was dark, she was negligent-"- as a 
matter of law because she chose the unsafe 
route." 
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"A similar situation was presented to the 
court in Williams v. City of New York, 214 N.Y. 
259, 108 N.E. 448, 449, and it was there said: 
'Another point urged against the plaintiff 
grows out of his conduct on the occasion of the 
accident. He had slipped down on the sidewalk 
just before he fell the second time and broke his 
leg. He pursued his way along the icy sidewalk 
instead of crossing the street to a sidewalk which 
was entirely clear. This, it is said, was contribu-
tory negligence, not merely justifying, but re-
quiring, the nonsuit. It may have been contribu-
tory negligence, as a matter of fact, but we think 
it was a question for the jury. In Twogood v. 
May·or etc., of New Y~ork, 102 N. Y. 216, 6 N .. E. 
275, it was held to be a question for the jury 
whether a plaintiff was chargeable with contribu-
tory negligence in venturing upon a walk in an 
icy condition 'vhen she might have avoided all 
danger by going upon the walk on the other side 
of the street which was clear and safe.' 
In the face of such facts, the court still held 
in the Williams case that the question of contri-
butory negligence was for the jury. A similar case 
is Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 44, 4 
N.W. 2d 365, 366, where the court likewise held 
that the question of contributory negligence 'vas 
for the jury. The court said: 
'It is well settled that mere knowledge that 
a walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, is not 
sufficient to establish contributory negligence 
though there is another way that is safe and con-
venient, and to defeat recovery it must appear 
that the traveler knew or as an ordinarily cau-
tious person should have known that it was jm-
p-rudent .to use the walk. Templin v. City of 
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B·oone, 127 Io,va 91, 102 N.W. 789; Reynolds v. 
City of Centerville, 151 Iowa 19, 129 N.W. 949; 
Gibson Y. City of DeniS'on, 153 Iowa 320, 133 N.W. 
712, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 644; Travers v. City of Em-
metsburg, 190 Io,va 717, 180 N.vV. 753; Lundy v. 
City of Ames, 202 Iowa 100, 209 N.W. 427; Franks 
v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1097, 296 N.W. 224.' 
In view of the foregoing authorities, and the 
long est~blished rule in this jurisdiction, that con-
tributory negligence is a question for a jury, we 
hold that the issue of contributory negligence 'vas 
properly submitted to the jury by the trial court.'' 
The condition of the hallway, to the plaintiff in the 
case at bar, was not more apparent than the darkness 
of the hall in the Miles case, or the ice on the sidewalk 
in the Williams case, nor is it the duty of plain tiff to 
negative contributory negligence in her pleading. 
2. THE DEFENDANT L. JANS~N, OR HIS. EM-
PLOYEES, WERE GUILTY OF NEGLI-
GENCE. 
The defendant was bound to use ordinary care in 
conducting his work to p·revent injury from occurring 
to the plaintiff. Plaintiff as a tenant had a right to the 
access of this hallway and it was the defendant's duty 
to either close off the area in which he was working 
or to keep the passage reasonably safe for the plaintiff 
while she was using the hall. 
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The test of the defendant's liability for such negli-
gence is set out in Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lumber 
Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121: 
" 'But the test of liability is not "'-hether, by 
the exercise of ordinary prudence, the defend-
ant could or eould not have foreseen the precise 
form in which the injury actually resulted, hut 
he must be held for anything which, after 
the injury is complete, appears to have been a 
natural and probable consequence of his act. If 
the act is one which the party, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, could have anticipated as likely 
to result in injury, then he is liable for any In-
jury actually resulting from it, althou~h he could 
not have anticipated the particular injury "\vhich 
did occur.' '' 
The court further states : 
''Where a dangerous condition is easily o b-
viated or rendered harmless, a failure to do one 
or the other may be considered in determining 
the question of negligence.'' 
In this case defendant Jansen could have seen that 
the drop cloth was smoothly laid so that people tra-
versing the hall would not cat~h their heels, or that his 
equipment was properly out of the way, or he could have 
completely blocked off the hall so that the same could 
not have been used by the tenants. The defendant is 
answerable for any foreseeable injury that might occur 
to tenants using the hallway as a result of the placing 
of equiprnent, in failing to keep the drop cloth properly 
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laid so that it would not becon1e ruffled and uneven, or 
in failing to take ordinary prec.autions to keep the 
tenants from using the particular area. The trial court 
clearly instructed the jury upon this point in its instruc-
tion Number 5 (Tr. p. 32). 
The conflict of evidence as to whether or not the 
defendant did in fact barricade the hallway and placH 
his equipment as he clain1s, or whether the passageway 
'vas left open and the drop cloth or canva.s was per-
mitted to extend into the hall in an improper and dan-
gerous condition was properly submitted to the jury and 
they, as the triers of the fact, believed the plaintiff, and 
this finding becomes the ultimate fact in this case. 
3. THE DOCTRINE O·F ASSUMPTION OF R,ISK 
IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CA,SE. 
As a general rule the doctrine of assumption of 
risk is not applicable in a case arising from a tort, but 
is applied in cases of contract and, particularly, under 
the W orkmens' Compensation Act. This doctrine is well 
stated in the case of Horne v. Neill, 70 Georgia Appeals, 
602, 29 S.E. 2d 275, wherein the court states as follows: 
''This court held in Brown v. Rome Machine 
& Fioundry C'o., 5 Ga. App. 142, 152, 62 S.E. 720, 
725: 'We hope that we have made it clear that 
assumption of risk is a defense which arises only 
from the contract that creates the 1·elationship 
essential to the duty upon the breach of \vhich 
the plaintiff's cause of action rests. Theoreti-
cally speaking, contributory negligence has no 
different meaning in actions by the servant 
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against the master from that which it universally 
has in suits based on torts. These foundations of 
liability and of defense, when reduced to final 
analysis, are but phases of well-recognized corn-
mon-law principles. If we bear in rnind that as-
sumption of risk finds its origin in the law of 
contract and is governed by the usual canons of 
construction applicable in the field of contract 
law, and that contributory negligence finds its 
origin in the law of torts and is governed by its 
cardinal canons, and that both defenses 1nay arise 
from the same set of circwnstances, though they 
do not necessarily do so, we ought to be able to 
deal with them without confusion.' Therefore 
we are -confirmed in our opinion that under the 
facts of this case the court committed no error 
in failing to give in charge to the jury the la'v 
of assumption of risk as the defendant contends." 
The defendant did not plead the defense of assump--
tion of risk. Defendant contends that it was not neces-
sary to plead assumption of risk because the elements 
thereof were proven by plaintiff in her own case. In 
this connection defendant has quoted from the evidence 
at great length, both under Point II and Point III in 
his brief. The plaintiff testified: 
'' Q. But it was west of the table so it left a very 
narrow passageway for you to get between 
the bucket and the table. Is that correct~ 
A. Well, it didn't obstruct the passageway. 
There was plenty of room. I had no thought 
of not being able to get through. The walk 
was wide enough to go through. 
Q. You thought it was wide enough to get 
through~ 
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.. A.. Oh, there "~a8n 't anything to make me feel 
that there ,,~as no roo1n to get by because 
there \vas room to get by ( Tr. pp. 96, 97). 
* * * * 
Q. ~Irs. Baker, you said the canvas wasn't 
folded like it is shown in the Exhibit 1 which 
:L\Ir. Richards showed you. Is that correct~ 
A. That's right, it \vasn 't folded like that. 
Q. Did you observe whether it was folded at all~ 
.. A.. Well, I couldn't say as to that. I know it 
wasn't smooth, and I had to step over it. It 
was uneven, and I felt that it was bunched 
at the end of the table, though, just crumpled 
up and bunched there, and I did step over 
with my left foot and caught my right heel in 
it, and it was held down by the table and 
didn't give, and it threw me down. 
Q. And you observed that condition before you 
stepped over-
A. I did. 
Q. -with your left foot~ 
A. Well, I was w·alkimg night along the hallway 
on my way out to go bo w·ork as I always do, 
·and I had no hesit:anc.IJJ 1ab out it beoause: it 
seemed perfectly all right, I could step over 
that. ( Tr. pp. 190, 191). '' (Italics ours) 
From the testimony it is apparent that plaintiff 
did not appreciate any danger or extraordinary hazard in 
traversing the hallway. For the doctrine of assumption 
of risk to be applicable, one must have knowledge and 
appreciation of the danger. 
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It is stated in 38 Am. Jur. p. 847, Sec. 173, "Knowl-
edge and appreciation of the danger is an essential of 
the defense of assumption of risk.'' Likewise, in the 
case of J(uchenmeiister v. Lo:s Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 
52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725, at page 729, the court states: 
''The distinction is also very intelligently 
discussed and clearly stated by the author in 3 
Labatt Mast. & Serv. Sec. 1219· et seq. The funda-
mental element in assumption of risk, where it is 
not assumed as a rna tter of con tract, as stated in 
the foregoing quotation, is 'intelligent choice'; 
that is, the employe, before he may be charged 
with having assumed the risk, must not only have 
fully understood and appreciated the danger, 
but he, in the very face of the danger, must, vol-
untarily, have assun1ed the risk of injury. N oth-
ing short of that constitutes intelligent choice.'' 
Neither under the pleadings nor the evidence was 
defendant entitled to an instruction involving the ques-
tion of assumption of risk. The defendant also failed to 
submit to the court a proper request for this defense 
even if it was proper under the pleadings and the facts 
of the case. This question we will discuss under our 
heading number 5. 
4. THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEG·LIGENCE AS A }fAT-
TER OF LAW. 
Defendant contends that if he was negligent and the 
passageway was hazardous, the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence in failing to have observed the 
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condition. Plaintiff did testify that she noticed that the 
cleaning had been started in the hall and that the canvas 
was rumpled at the end (Tr. p. 93). There is no evidence 
that after observing these facts she carelessly hurried 
down the hall or failed to proceed with caution (Tr. p. 
190). ·The only other claim is that th~re was another exit 
available, which plaintiff failed to take. This court in 
the case of Moo.~e v. Miles, supra, held that such facts 
do not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of 
law, and the question of contributory negligence should 
be submitted to the jury. 
''The next question for consideration is 
whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law in proeeeding down the 
darkened hallway knowing that the stairway was 
at the end thereof. In this jurisdiction we are 
committed to the doctrine that the question of 
·contributory negligence is one for the jury, where 
as said in C:arpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 
P. 2d 617, 619, 'different conclusions may be rea-
sonably drawn by different minds from the same 
evidence * * *.' See also, Olsen v. Hayden Hold-
ing C·o., .supra; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 
57 P. 2d 708; Shortino v. Salt Lake & Utah R. R. 
C·o., 52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860; Larkin v. Saltair 
Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 P. 686, 3 L.R.A., N.S., 
983, 116 Am. St. R.ep. 818; Hone v. Mammoth Min. 
Co., 27 Utah 168, 75 P. 381; Smith v. Rio Grande 
Western Ry. Co., 9 Utah 141, 33 P. 626. And from 
other jurisdictions L'Heureux v. Hurley, 117 
Conn. 347, 168 A. 8; Sodekson v. Lynch, 314 Mass. 
161, 49 N.E. 2d 901; Armstrong v. Yakima Hotel 
Co., 75 Wash. 477, 135 P. 233." 
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5. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY IN-
ST~UCTED THE JURY AS TO THE 
THEO·RY AND L·A W OF THE CASE. 
Defendant claims that the court fully instructed the 
jury as to plaintiff's theory of the case but failed to 
instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the case as 
requested. It is true that the court did instruct the jury 
in accordance with plaintiff's pleadings and, as· we con-
tend, in accordance with the evidence introduced. What 
was defendant's theory~ From the pleading there are 
no specific grounds of contributory negligence alleged, 
nor did he :plead the defense of assumption of risk. 
The court fully instructed on the question of contributory 
negligence by its instructions numbers ·5, 6 and 8 (Tr. 
p:p. 32-33). Defendant then contends that the court com-
mitted error because it did not give defendant's re-
quested instructions numbers 6, 8 and 9. The court was 
justified in refusing to give instruction number 6 be-
cause that instruction does not state the law. The in-
struction reads as follows : 
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in tra-
versing the hallway of the apartment was not 
relieved of the necessity of exercising ordinary 
care for her own safety. If you find that the de-
fendant's equipment was placed in the halhvay 
in such a manner that it constituted a hazard 
which plaintiff under the circumstances should 
have observed and that plaintiff, notvvithstand-
ing the fact that other exits were available to 
her, proceeded to take the hazardous course, then 
you must find that she assumed the risk of any 
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injury '\vhich she sustained and your verdict shall 
be in favor of the defendant Jansen, no cause 
of action.~' (Tr. p. ±5). 
This instruction is erroneous even if the evidence 
and pleadings "\Yere such as to permit it, which we con-
tend they were not, for by the instruction the jury was 
instructed that if plaintiff observed that the hallway was 
hazardous and she still eontinued to take the hazardous 
course rather than another exit which was available 
to her their verdict must be in favor of the defendant. 
Under the law, if the principle of assumption of risk 
was involved in this case, the question should have been 
left to the jury to determine whether or not she as-
sumed the risk by going over the hazardous passageway 
rather than using one of the other exits. Likewise 1n 
defendant's requested instruction number 8 which is 
as follows: 
"If you find that the defendant's equipment 
was placed in the hallway in such a manner that 
it constituted a hazard and that plaintiff ob-
serve-d, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
have observed such hazard, then you are in-
structed that plaintiff was negligent in not tak-
ing either the east or south stairways which were 
available to her and your verdict shall be against 
the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant Jan-
sen, no cause· of action. " (Tr. P·· 47) . 
the jury was instructed that plaintiff was negligent 
in not taking either the east or south stairways which 
were available and that the verdict should he against 
her. This is the very question that should have been 
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left to the jury to determine. As stated in the case of 
Mo:ore v. Miles, supra, this court held that it was not 
negligence as a matter of law for the plaintiff to have 
proceeded down the dark hall, but it was for the jury 
to determine whether an ordinarily cautious person 
should have known that it was imprudent to have chosen 
the unsafe route when another and welllight€d stairway 
was available. 
There was no instruction requested by the defend-
ant that would have submitted to the jury the question 
whether it was negligence for plaintiff to proceed along 
the hallway to the front stairs rather than to take either 
the side or back stairs to the next :floor. A party can-
not claim that the jury was not properly instructed upon 
a point in question unless the p-arty makes a request to 
the court for such an instruction, or excepts to the court's 
failure to instruct on the particular point. 81J)tlbon v. Otis 
Elev~at~or Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437. 
Defendant's requested instruction number 9 (Tr. p. 
48) was given in part by the court's instructions num-
bers 5 and 6 ( Tr. p. 32). There is no evidence to support 
the contention that plaintiff was negligent in the manner 
in which she passed or attem,pted to pass by or over the 
equipment, and the court was justified in not including 
that element in its instructions to the jury. The court 
did instruct the jury in its instructions numbers 5 and 6 
that plaintiff must use ordinary care for her own safety 
before she was entitled to recover, and then instruction 
number 8 clearly defined "ordinary care". 
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6. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIV-
ING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4, NOR DID 
THE COURT ERR IN IN'STR.UCTING THE 
JURY O·RALL.Y AND THEN STRIKING A 
P .A.RT THEREOF FROM SAID WRITTEN 
INSTRUCTION. 
Instruction number 4 as originally given to the 
jury is set out at length on page 47 of defendant's brief. 
After the court had read the instructions to the jury and 
the jury had retired to deliberate ( Tr. p. 197), the de-
fendant excepted to instruction number 4 and the whole 
thereof, ''and particularly orally instructing the jury 
at the end of the said instruction'', as indicated in the 
portion of the instruction number 4 italicized (Tr. p·. 
198). The record is not clear as to what the defendant 
meant in his exception by the court having ''orally'' in-
structed the jury at the end of said instruction number 
4, but when the exception was taken, the court offered to 
recall the jury and to read instruction number 4 ''as 
deleted'' ( Tr. p. 198). This offer was refused by the 
defendant (Tr. p. 199). Instruction number 4 (Tr. p. 32) 
shows that ink lines were drawn through the italicized 
portion of the instruction as it is quoted on page 47 of 
defendants' brief, and this was apparently done after the 
court had read the entire instruction to the jury, but be-
fore handing the instructions to the bailiff for delivery 
to the jury in the jury room, as the court state, ''I 
thought it would be better not to reread it to them, 
thereby giving emphasis to it. I struck it fron1 the writ-
ten one, but if you desire at this time I will recall the 
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jury and read that to them as it is now written." (Tr. 
p. 198) 0 
Defendant now complains about instruction number 
4 chiefly on the ground that the instruction indicates 
absolut·e liability when considered without the portion 
deleted by the court. We submit that the instruction as 
originally written was entirely proper and that where 
the defendant has particularized in connection with his 
exception and the court having acted in response thereto, 
he cannot be heard to complain about the instruction con-
strued without the portion deleted. But, in any event, 
we do not subscribe to the contention that the instruction 
as finally given can he construed as defendant claims. 
The word ''if'' is used in the instruction and when given 
full meaning leaves to the jury the determination of 
whether or not the defendant was negligent as claimed. 
There being no prejudicial error, the verdict of the 
jury and the judgment entered thereon should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUS·TIN & RICHARDS, 
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